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BACKGROUND AND HISTORY IN BRIEF 
ulminating more than a decade of debates, the Brazilian 
government enacted the Nova Lei de Falências e 
Recuperação de Empresas, Law N° 11,101 (“Brazilian 
Bankruptcy Law” or “BBL”),1  which was published on 9 
February 2005 and came into effect on 9 June 2005. It was the 
first major overhaul of Brazil’s corporate insolvency laws in 
sixty years. The BBL replaced the previous bankruptcy law, i.e. 
Decree-Law 7,661 (“Prior Bankruptcy Law”), which had been 
in force since 1945. The BBL represents a significant change in 
the principles and in the form of activity of the various players 
involved in bankruptcy and reorganisation processes in Brazil. 
Most ancient practices are now abandoned as society 
increasingly adapts itself to the new stimuli incorporated into 
the Brazilian legal system by the BBL, which has completed a 
decade in 2015.  
One of the primary aims of the BBL is to provide financially 
distressed but economically viable companies with the 
opportunity to restructure their operations through market-
based solutions directly negotiated with creditors. The public 
policy underlying the reforms is expressed in article 47 of the 
BBL, which states that the new law seeks to make it possible 
for debtors to overcome their economic and financial crises 
while maintaining the production source, the employment of 
workers, and the interests of creditors, thus enabling debtors 
to continue the operation of their businesses, preserve the 
social function of their companies, and foster economic 
activity2. Other important goals include maximising the value 
of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors and achieving 
flexible and equitable treatment among creditors3. 
                                                
1 Concurrently, Brazil enacted Supplementary Law nº 118/05, which summarizes 
relevant aspects of Brazil’s tax laws with the BBL. 
2 BBL, Chapter III, Section. 1, art. 47. 
3 The BBL relaxes the principle requiring debtors to provide identical treatment for 
each claim existing within a particular class of claims (par conditio creditorum), A good 
example of the application of this new concept is the Judicial Reorganisation of 
Stampafare Embalagem Ltda. In this case, the largest creditor-supplier possessed an “in 
rem guarantee” claim (the equivalent of a secured claim) against the debtor. The 
creditor-supplier agreed to support a proposed reorganisation plan in which a 
significant portion of its claim would be paid after all other creditors (including 
creditors in classes lower in priority of repayment in the event of a Bankruptcy 
Liquidation) received their distributions in full under the plan. Also, the creditor-
C 
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The previous statute had numerous fundamental weaknesses, 
such as prohibiting debtors from negotiating plans of 
reorganisation directly with their creditors. Under the Prior 
Bankruptcy Law, a negotiation could be sanctioned with what was 
referred to as an “act of bankruptcy.”4 These acts automatically 
opened the door to a bankruptcy petition against the debtor, 
which could be decreed independently of the debtor’s economic 
condition – that is to say, even if it were solvent. It also granted 
debtors a very limited debt discharge. For example, the concordata 
was the sole court-supervised reorganisation proceeding under 
the Prior Bankruptcy Law.5 
The debt discharge available to debtors pursuing a concordata was 
restricted to a statutorily prescribed percentage of unsecured 
claims6, and since the concordata was based on the principle of par 
conditio creditorum, a debtor was required to provide identical 
treatment to all interests of different creditors. Consequently, few 
debtors were able to shed sufficient amounts of debt to 
restructure their operations successfully. Consequently, 
bankruptcy liquidations comprised the vast majority of insolvency 
proceedings under the former law. Another glaring deficiency of 
the Prior Bankruptcy Law was the absence of incentives for 
debtors to reorganise with speed and efficiency. 
Another shortcoming of the Prior Bankruptcy Law was the 
limited safeguards for secured creditors in a bankruptcy 
liquidation where insufficient assets existed to pay all claims in 
full. Unlike the layers of protection afforded to holders of secured 
claims under the US Bankruptcy Code, the Prior Bankruptcy Law 
generally prevented secured creditors in Brazil from enforcing 
pre-petition guarantees or redeeming the collateral securing a 
                                                                                                    
supplier and another supplier agreed to extend credit lines to the debtor and a bank 
provided “post-petition” financing. The proposed plan was approved by the vast 
majority creditors and confirmed by the court. Besides, and in line with the flexibility 
idea, current jurisprudence admits the payment of unsecured creditors before secured 
ones in certain circumstances. In fact, several plans of reorganisation approved in the 
past three years contemplated the possibility to pay “strategic creditors” with priority to 
other creditors, regardless of their credit quality. 
4 Despite this prohibition, the attempt to prevent negotiation between debtors and 
creditors, as introduced in the Brazilian legal system by the Prior Bankruptcy Law, did 
not work out since debtors frequently negotiated through fronting parties the 
assignment of credits at a discount that was not always the same for all creditors. This 
means that there have always been negotiations between debtors and creditors, albeit 
outside the realm of the law. 
5 The concordata was based, in part, on the principle of par conditio creditorum, that is, the 
requirement that a debtor provide identical treatment to all claims or interests within a 
particular class of claims. 
6 In its most basic form, a preventive concordata (a form of’ the concordata) granted 
debtors a discharge for a percentage of unsecured claims determined by a statutory 
formula (capped at a maximum of 50 percent of total unsecured claims). However, the 
discharge provided by the preventive concordata was potentially illusory. Debtors were 
limited to a 24-month period from commencement of a preventive concordata to make 
the required payments to holders of unsecured claims, and the allowable percentage 
discharge decreased during this 24-month period, depending on the date that the debtor 
actually made payment (e.g., the allowed discharge was 50 percent of total unsecured 
claims if payment was made at the beginning of the preventive concordata) and 
decreased to no discharge (if the debtor was unable to pay claimants until the end of the 
24-month period). 
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loan. The primary source of this problem was the priority scheme 
for claims.  
Under the Prior Bankruptcy Law, secured claims were placed 
lower in priority than two classes of potentially unlimited claims – 
labour claims (first priority) and tax claims (second priority). Since 
labour claims and tax claims are frequently enormous in Brazil, 
there were generally few assets remaining in a debtor’s estate to 
satisfy secured claims. As a result, Brazilian lenders incurred 
tremendous losses due to loan defaults in bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the Prior Bankruptcy Law failed to protect 
purchasers of assets in bankruptcy from successor liability. 
For example, the previous statute did not contain a provision 
comparable to §363 under the US Bankruptcy Code nor to article 
60, single paragraph, of the BBL, which generally authorises the 
sale of a debtor’s assets “free and clear” of all interests. Rather, 
investors purchasing assets through insolvency proceedings in 
Brazil were saddled with successor liability for labour claims and 
tax claims related to such assets that accrued during the debtor’s 
period of ownership. Because the actual amounts of such claims 
were not generally known or capable of accurate estimation at the 
time of a sale, investors avoided purchasing assets from debtors. 
Consequently, the Prior Bankruptcy Law hampered the 
development of any meaningful market in Brazil for the sale of 
assets in bankruptcy7.  
The BBL is guided by the basic principle that debtors generally 
possess greater social value as a going concern than they do from 
the piecemeal sale of their assets through forced liquidations. 
Accordingly, a key component of the BBL is the creation of two 
new legal proceedings, the Recuperação Judicial (“Judicial 
Reorganisation”) and the Recuperação Extrajudicial (“Out-of-Court” 
or “Pre-package Reorganisation”), both of which authorise 
debtors to obtain court confirmation of reorganisation plans 
negotiated directly with their creditors. The introduction of these 
two new reorganisation options is an acknowledgement in Brazil 
that the role of the courts in overseeing corporate insolvency 
proceedings should be limited to clearing the obstacles that 
prevent debtors from achieving market solutions to financial and 
economic crisis, with the Superior Court of Justice’s 
acknowledgement of the courts’ role being limited to review of 
the lawfulness of the chosen procedures8. In other words, the 
BBL recognises that the judiciary is not the best body to find the 
means of reorganisation for a company in distress, and limits its 
role (when compared to the Prior Bankruptcy Law) to conducting 
the process of negotiation between debtors and creditors in 
accordance with the terms and within the limits prescribed by 
law. 
                                                
7 L. PAIVA, C. JARVINEN, “The New Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law in Brazil”, 28th 
Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy & Reorganization, volume two, Practising Law 
Institute, 2006. 
8  For instance, please refer to the Superior Court of Justice’s precedent REsp no. 
1,314,209 – SP, ruled by the 3rd panel, justice Nancy Andrighi, ruled on 5.22.12. 
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The BBL represented a leap ahead in the Brazilian bankruptcy 
legislation and brought it closer to the best bankruptcy laws in 
force, such as that of the United States and of certain European 
countries. In short, it provided debtors with more effective 
mechanisms to protect their business (as compared to the old 
concordata) and with greater flexibility in designing reorganisation 
strategies. It also increased safeguards for secured creditors; 
broadened creditors’ involvement in the reorganisation process; 
and improved creditors’ ability to recover their credits. 
Additionally, it turned acquisitions of parts of distressed 
companies increasingly attractive, by furthering their legal security 
through a free and clear acquisition structure. 
Despite the improvements introduced by the BBL, it is a fact 
that several factors have contributed to the difficulties and 
uncertainties that arose in the initial period of application of the 
BBL: (1) the Judiciary’s poor understanding of its new role; (2) 
the fact that few judges were specialised in bankruptcy, 
reorganisation practices and economic aspects involved in 
insolvency proceedings; and (3) the fact that, since the 
bankruptcy law is federal, its application is a duty and a function 
of the courts of the states (Brazilian political subdivisions), which 
results in the judges of small legal districts having to apply it. 
Within the Brazilian territory, these uncertainties will 
undoubtedly be overcome as these new legal tools and regimes 
are used repeatedly. 
MAIN SOURCES9 
Brazil has no unified legislation to regulate insolvency regimes. 
There are two basic regimes: one for business companies and 
sole proprietorships and another for non-business associations 
and companies and natural persons (including consumers). 
The BBL regulates out-of-court reorganisation, judicial 
reorganisation and bankruptcy for companies and 
businesspersons. The insolvency of natural persons or non-
business associations is ruled by the Brazilian Civil Code 
(“CC”); the rules of insolvency procedure are set forth in the 
Civil Procedure Code (“CPC”). 
Financial institutions, in turn, are only partially subject to the 
regime set forth in the BBL, since in addition to not being 
allowed to claim the protection of a judicial or extrajudicial 
reorganisation, they can only be adjudged bankrupt after having 
been submitted to an intervention and/or extrajudicial 
liquidation conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil in the 
manner prescribed in Law No. 6024 of March 13, 1974. 
There are also some legal entities that are not subject to any of 
the abovementioned regimes but rather to extrajudicial 
liquidations established in the specific laws that regulate their 
                                                
9 Legislation (unified legislation or fragmented), precedents, main handbooks. 
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respective activities, such as, for instance, the law that governs 
cooperatives’ activities. 
Finally, there are laws that regulate other matters but that 
produce profound effects on the activity or the reorganisation 
of companies in distress. Supplementary Law No. 118, which 
amends and adds new provisions to the National Tax Code 
(Law No. 5,172 of 25 October 1966) so that it conforms with 
the BBL is a case in point. 
Because of their importance, this work will address only the first 
two regimes mentioned above, contemplated by the BBL and by 
the Civil Code, with emphasis on the former. 
§ 1 – SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF CREDITOR 
RIGHTS IN GENERAL10 
Brazilian law establishes the following types of security for 
immovable property: 
– Mortgage: The debtor (or a third party on its behalf) grants 
right in rem to the creditor for immovable property. If the debt is 
not paid, the creditor can ask the court to sell the mortgaged 
property (at a public auction or by adjudication), and the proceeds 
are used to pay the amount owed. 
– Antichresis pledge: With this specific type of pledge, the 
debtor transfers possession of income-earning property to the 
creditor, who can retain it and receive any income from it until 
the debt is discharged. The property can belong to either the 
debtor or a third party. 
As for movable property, a pledge is the type of security 
prescribed by law. 
– Pledge: Movable property is transferred by a debtor (or a third 
party on its behalf) to the creditor (or its representative) as 
security for a debt. Stocks, rights and credit instruments (such as 
trade acceptance bills and promissory notes) can also be pledged. 
The types of security above entitle their holders to be treated as 
creditors guaranteed by a security interest in the event of judicial 
or extrajudicial reorganisation or even bankruptcy of the debtor. 
– Fiduciary Lien: In addition to these types of security, Brazilian 
law grants certain privileges to the creditor holding a fiduciary lien 
over movable or immovable assets or a fiduciary lien over rights 
to movable assets, particularly negotiable instruments. The claims 
held by these creditors are not subject to judicial or extrajudicial 
reorganisation or to bankruptcy of the debtor because the 
respective creditors have the right to claim return of the secured 
assets to satisfy their credits through sale of the respective 
security. 
In a fiduciary lien, title to movable and immovable property is 
transferred to the creditor. The debtor can retain physical 
possession of the property and legal title is returned if and when 
it pays the debt in full, as agreed in the contract. Rights and credit 
                                                
10 Forms of security acknowledged by the system. 
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instruments can also be subject to a fiduciary lien in transactions 
carried out under the National Financial System. This type of 
security is also available for immovable property. 
 
§ 2 – REGULATORY FRAMEWORK11 
Insolvency proceedings, especially those governed by the BBL, as 
well as civil insolvency proceedings, fall under the exclusive 
authority of the state courts. Each Brazilian state has its own state 
courts and, as a rule, most Brazilian cities have state courts. 
Judges in small judicial districts rule over all types of disputes, 
including those involving family law, criminal law and insolvency. 
In larger judicial districts, where there are more judges, there is 
usually a certain degree of specialisation, with judges being 
granted authority to rule over more specific matters. However, 
very few judicial districts have judges specialising in insolvency 
matters (e.g. Rio de Janeiro) and few appellate courts (which 
decide appeals filed against first-instance decisions) have 
specialised chambers to review insolvency matters (e.g.  Sao 
Paulo). 
Thus, considering that, as a rule, the authority to process an 
insolvency case falls on the court in the judicial district where the 
main establishment of the debtor is located or in his domicile (in 
cases dealing with consumer insolvency), most insolvency cases 
are decided by judges not specialised in insolvency matters. 
There is also no specific regulation for insolvency professionals in 
Brazil. It is incumbent on the judge to appoint the trustee and set 
his fees, subject to certain criteria prescribed by law. Under the 
BBL, the trustee is not appointed by one of the largest creditors, 
as happens in civil insolvency proceedings (and in bankruptcy 
proceedings governed by the repealed Bankruptcy Law). The 
current rule, as stipulated in the BBL, determines that the trustee 
must be a reputable professional, preferably a lawyer, economist, 
business manager or accountant, or a specialised legal entity and 
will serve as the legal agent of the debtor’s estate. 
In the judicial reorganisation proceedings governed by the BBL, 
the trustee acts as a mere inspector of the debtor’s activity, not 
interfering in any way with the decisions relating to the debtor’s 
management, regardless of its notable influence in the procedure. 
In bankruptcy and civil insolvency, however, the trustee is 
responsible for managing the assets and defending the interests of 
the bankrupt. 
The judge reviewing the cases governed by the BBL or civil 
insolvency cases does not interfere with the engagement of other 
                                                
11 Regulator/ supervisor, regulation of insolvency practitioners, role of judiciary in 
insolvency related matters (both liquidation and rescue). Professional qualifications, and 
disciplinary arrangements for insolvency practitioners, to which practitioners are subject 
(lawyers/accountants/other – e.g. directly authorised). (Code of ethics, trust accounts 
etc.). The judicial structures in place to deal with insolvency matters, in addition to the 
“role” of the judiciary (i.e. special insolvency or commercial courts/combined 
jurisdiction/administrative officials/other). 
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professionals involved in the proceeding, whether lawyers and/or 
financial advisors of the debtor or advisors of the creditors. On 
the other hand, the creditors must pay the expenses of their 
representatives, including expenses relating to the creditors’ 
committee. 
§ 3 – CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY AND/OR NON-BUSINESS 
INSOLVENCY IN BRAZIL12 
As noted above, the insolvency of natural persons (which 
includes consumers) or non-business associations is ruled by the 
CC, and the rules of insolvency procedure are set forth in the 
CPC. These rules only apply to natural persons and to non-
business entities; merchants, business companies or company 
insolvency events are governed by specific legislation (“BBL”). 
An individual (“Debtor”) becomes insolvent when his debts are 
greater than his assets. Differently from the BBL, where 
insolvency is held to occur when the business entity or merchant 
does not meet its payments obligations as and when due, the 
insolvency of natural persons follows an economic concept where 
the assets vs. debts relation is key to determine whether a Debtor 
is insolvent. 
The law is lacking in effective rescue mechanisms for the 
debtor, which is required to liquidate its assets to pay its 
liabilities. The only rescue remedy available to the insolvent 
debtor is weak and of almost no practical use, as it requires the 
agreement of all creditors and may only be triggered at a certain 
point of the insolvency proceeding, a phase that, in practice, 
occurs many years after the insolvency is adjudicated. 
For the Debtor and his creditors, the effects of insolvency are 
similar to those in the liquidation of a business entity. In fact, a 
declaration of insolvency triggers the composition among all 
creditors on equal condition (par conditio creditorum), observing any 
distinctions in terms of credit quality. Upon declaration of 
insolvency, a Debtor’s assets and obligations make up the 
insolvency estate (“Estate”). The declaration of insolvency also 
causes an acceleration of the Debtors’ obligations, and the 
Debtor is removed from management of his own assets until the 
Estate is entirely paid. All of the Debtors’ assets13 are collected 
and liquidated, and the proceeds are earmarked for payment of 
the Estate. 
The insolvency court appoints a trustee from among the major 
creditors of the Estate (“Trustee”). It is incumbent on the 
Trustee, acting under the insolvency court supervision: to 
manage, gather and sell Estate assets; to represents the Estate in 
                                                
12 Topic written jointly with Thiago Braga Junqueira. 
13 Only the assets eligible to attachment may be collected. CC states a few assets which 
are not eligible for attachment, including the residence of the debtor’s family. This 
protection, however, does not apply in cases of collection of debt resulting from a loan 
taken out to finance the purchase of the house. 
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any type of judicial or extrajudicial proceeding; to adopt all 
measures necessary to defend the Estate’s interests; and to settle 
Estate claims. The Trustee is entitled to fees as determined by the 
insolvency court. The Trustee must use the proceeds of asset 
liquidation to settle all of the Estate obligations. 
The Estate comprises all the credits held against the Debtor, and 
the ranking of creditors is quite similar to the ranking established 
by the BBL – except for the absence of a cap on the privilege 
given to labour credits, and for the fact that tax credits rank 
above secured credits (please see item 6.1.3 for the treatment 
given to creditors under the BBL). If the proceeds available at the 
Estate for distribution to a certain class of creditors are 
insufficient to fully serve and pay all claims of that specific class, 
these funds must be proportionally distributed and allocated 
among the creditors according to the value of their claims in the 
respective class. 
As a rule, the Debtor is discharged only upon settlement of all 
claims against the Estate. If the asset liquidation proceeds are 
insufficient to settle the entire Estate, the Debtor will remain 
liable for outstanding debts during five years from the liquidation 
closing decision. During this period, any asset acquired by the 
Debtor will be part of the Estate and liquidated to pay the 
remaining creditors. 
In short, the law does not provide the debtor with efficient rescue 
remedies or with a fresh start. As a result, the debtor ends up 
being placed on the margins of society, seeking informal jobs (if a 
natural person) that allow him not to declare his income, having 
no access to financing instruments, and no longer acquiring assets 
in his name. On the other hand, because the outcome of the civil 
insolvency proceeding usually generates no or practically no 
percentage of credit recovery for creditors, they end up by opting 
against initiating a civil insolvency proceeding 
against a debtor when there are no assets to be pledged to satisfy 
the individual enforcement carried out by the respective creditor. 
These factors make of civil insolvency a remedy practically not 
used in Brazil. 
§ 4 – CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY (BUSINESS INSOLVENCY) 
The BBL offers two alternatives for insolvent companies to 
obtain court confirmation of reorganisation plans negotiated 
directly with their creditors, via recuperação judicial (judicial 
reorganisation), which is somehow similar to the Chapter 11 
protection of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“US 
Bankruptcy Code”) and recuperação extrajudicial (out-of-court 
reorganisation). The BBL also preserves a revised falência 
(bankruptcy liquidation), which is analogous to Chapter 7 
proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
– Who may petition for bankruptcy or reorganisation: 
Every business company and business person labelled as “debtor” 
qualifies for bankruptcy and reorganisation. Government-owned 
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entities and mixed-capital companies do not fall within the 
regimes prescribed by the BBL. The “de facto business entity” may 
have its bankruptcy declared, but cannot apply for judicial or out-
of-court reorganisation. 
– Who may not petition for bankruptcy or reorganisation: 
Government-owned or private financial institutions; Public or 
private financial institutions; Credit unions; Purchasing pools; 
Private pension entities; Health care plan companies; Insurance 
companies; Special savings companies; Any other comparable 
entities. 
 Liquidation (bankruptcy) A)
Liquidation aims to end a debtor’s business activities by 
preserving and optimising the company’s goods, assets, and 
production sources so that they can be used to settle debts in a 
stated order of priority (BBL, article 75). It is a procedure 
analogous to Chapter 7 under the US Bankruptcy Code. 
1) Elig ibi l i ty  and requirements 
Liquidation may be requested if a company fails to pay its debt14 
as and when due. Alternatively, an applicant can prove that the 
debtor has committed an act that characterises its bankruptcy, 
within a certain period established by law, unless that act is part 
of a judicial reorganisation plan. Acts that characterise a 
bankruptcy include: 
Failing to pay, set aside or attach assets within twenty-four hours 
in enforcement proceedings; Liquidating assets prematurely; 
Making payments fraudulently; Conveying, or attempting to 
convey, any assets to a third party (which may include other 
creditors) with the object of delaying payments or defrauding 
creditors; Transferring an establishment to a third party (which 
may be a creditor) without the consent of all creditors and 
without reserving sufficient assets to settle all liabilities; 
Simulating the transfer of a principal establishment with the 
purpose of circumventing the law, or harming a creditor; Giving 
or increasing a guarantee to a creditor for an existing debt, 
without reserving sufficient assets to settle all liabilities; For an 
individual business debtor: absenting himself without leaving a 
qualified representative with sufficient funds to pay creditors; 
abandoning an establishment ; or attempting to hide the 
location of his place of domicile, his headquarters or his 
principal establishment from the authorities; and/or Failing to 
perform an obligation under a judicial reorganisation plan within 
the required period. 
A financially distressed company may voluntarily file for 
bankruptcy liquidation if it demonstrates that its business is 
unfeasible. In practical terms, debtors only opt for bankruptcy 
                                                
14 To see who is eligible to bankruptcy, please see item § 4 above. 
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when their economic activity is no longer viable, or is beyond 
recovery. Even so, lawyers recommend voluntary bankruptcy only 
in exceptional cases, because of the risks existing in Brazil with 
regard to personal liability of officers and shareholders for 
labour, taxation and social security obligations or for damage to 
the environment and consumers, also considering that the 
authorities will investigate into mismanagement and bankruptcy 
crimes once bankruptcy is decreed. 
Once a petition for involuntary bankruptcy is filed with the court, 
the debtor must pay the debt owed, and/or submit a defence, 
within ten days. To avoid liquidation, the debtor may also file for 
judicial reorganisation within the same period (please see item 
6.2.1 below). 
If a defence is not filed or is rejected and/or the debtor has not 
paid the debt, a bankruptcy decree is granted, and a court-
appointed trustee will replace the debtor’s directors and officers. 
Gathering and appraisal of the debtor’s assets (including real 
properties or movable assets subject to in rem guarantees) must 
occur promptly after the trustee is appointed. The debtor’s assets 
must be realised in an expeditious manner to maximise value 
(preferably, as a going-concern or in blocks) and the proceeds will 
be earmarked to pay the creditors claims.15 The debtor’s assets 
and liabilities make up the bankruptcy estate. 
Once a schedule of assets has been prepared, assets are sold. The 
court orders this to be done by public auction, sealed bids or 
public proclamation, depending on the advice provided by the 
trustee and by the committee of creditors (if there is one). The 
risk of tax, labour and social security succession does not apply to 
any judicial sale carried out under bankruptcy proceedings (Article 
60, single paragraph, of the BBL and Supplementary Law No. 
118). Creditors are paid in the statutory order of priority set forth 
under article 83 of the BBL. 
2) Directors’ liability: fraudulent, reckless 
insolvent trading, etc16 
The shareholders and senior managers of a bankrupt company 
can be personally liable for labour, social security and tax 
obligations, depending on the type of company, and the conduct 
and actions of the senior managers. 
The bankruptcy court verifies the liabilities of partners, 
controllers and officers of a bankrupt company, irrespective of 
whether assets have been liquidated or whether there is any 
evidence showing that the debtor's assets are not sufficient to 
meet liabilities. The court can, on its own initiative or at the 
                                                
15 L. PAIVA , C. JARVINEN, “Current Developments Under The New Bankruptcy and 
Restructuring Law in Brazil,” at 30th Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy & 
Reorganization, volume two, Practising Law Institute. 
16 Original excerpt by L. PAIVA and P. COSTA, extracted from the Brazil chapter of the 
Restructuring and Insolvency Handbook, 2005/2006, Fourth Edition, Practical Law 
Company, as adapted and supplemented for this work. 
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request of interested parties, order that the defendants' private 
assets (at a value sufficient to cover the damage caused) be 
frozen, until a liability is eventually determined. A criminal 
investigation into the commitment of bankruptcy crimes may 
be instated. 
The corporate veil can be disregarded so that shareholders 
(including parent companies) and senior managers can also be 
held liable for the company's debts in cases of fraud, abuse of 
control or equity confusion. 
Certain acts performed during the voidability period (termo legal) 
(except when performed in accordance with the judicial 
reorganisation plan) are declared ineffective or revoked in relation 
to the bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether the parties were 
aware of the financial condition of the debtor or had the 
intention of defrauding creditors. These include, among others: 
payment of debts not yet due; payment of due debts in a manner 
that is not provided for under the respective instrument; creation 
of a security interest for an existing debt. 
Completed transactions can be undone if they were performed 
fraudulently, irrespective of the period which has elapsed since 
their occurrence. 
3) Rules o f  dis tr ibut ion (secured and 
unsecured credi tors  as wel l  as pr ior i t i es )  
All debts become due at the time of bankruptcy. If this is 
before the due date in the original agreement, interest owed is 
reduced proportionately. All foreign currency-denominated 
claims are converted into domestic currency, at the exchange 
rate on the date of the bankruptcy decree. Debts due by the 
date of the bankruptcy decree are offset against claims in 
favour of the debtor, with priority over all other creditors; 
agreements to settle National Financial System obligations can 
be terminated early by the non-bankrupt party; and claims in 
favour of the debtor can be offset against claims in favour of the 
non-bankrupt party. 
All creditors (excluding the tax authorities) must prove their 
claims, or prove any discrepancy vis-à-vis the list of creditors 
presented by the debtor, within 15 days of a bankruptcy decree. 
The trustee then prepares a general list of creditors within 45 
days, after which creditors may file an opposition to the list 
within 10 days. The general list of creditors is then ratified by the 
court. 
1. Pursuant to article 83 of the BBL, creditors subject to 
bankruptcy liquidation are paid on a rateable basis in the 
following order: Labour (capped at 150 minimum wages 
per creditor) and occupational accident claims; 
2. Secured claims up to the amount of the encumbered 
asset value; 
3. Tax claims (except tax penalties); 
4. Special privilege claims; 
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5. General privilege claims; 
6. Unsecured claims ; 
7. Contractual fines and pecuniary penalties for breach of 
administrative or criminal laws (including those of a tax 
nature); and 
8. Subordinated claims. 
The BBL specifically excludes from bankruptcy liquidation any 
claims or assets: Related to the owner of a fiduciary lien on 
movable or immovable assets (alienação/cessão fiduciária); Arising 
from a leasing agreement; or Derived from advances of money 
on an export exchange contract (Adiantamento sobre Contrato de 
Câmbio – ACC). 
Also, article 84 of the BBL establishes that post-petition claims 
(créditos extraconcursais) have preference of payment over all other 
claims ranked by article 83 of the BBL. Post-petition claims 
include the expenses of the estate during the bankruptcy 
liquidation. If the bankruptcy liquidation was the result of a 
conversion from a judicial reorganisation, the post-petition 
claims include the debts incurred by the debtor during the 
judicial reorganisation. When a claim is guaranteed by a specific 
asset (i.e, in rem guarantee), the creditor will receive the exact 
amount raised by selling the respective asset. The portion of the 
claim beyond the respective asset’s sale proceeds could qualify as 
an unsecured claim. 
As a rule, interest is only paid if there are sufficient funds to pay 
the principal owed to all creditors; usually, creditors start 
receiving payments of the principal within a few months from 
sale of the estate’s assets. 
4) Treatment o f  avoidable  dispos i t ions 
and executory contracts  
A contract continues to be performed if the trustee, upon 
authorization of the committee of creditors (if any), considers it 
in the best interests of the company. If the trustee or the 
committee determines that continuing a contract is detrimental to 
the estate, it must is terminated or set aside. 
5) Posi t ion o f  employees  
If the company continues to operate, particularly if the 
intention is to sell the business as a going concern, the jobs are 
kept and the wages resulting from the services provided after 
the adjudication of bankruptcy must be paid on time. 
Conversely, if the company’s activity is discontinued as a result 
of the adjudication of bankruptcy, its employees will be 
dismissed and must file the respective labour claim with the 
labour courts to have their claims recognised and, after that, file 
their proof of credit. 
Moreover, creditors holding labour claims make up a separate 
class for voting purposes in the general meeting of creditors and 
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may appoint a representative to sit on the creditors’ committee, 
if instated. Finally, creditors holding labour claims may propose 
to the general meeting of creditors alternatives for realisation of 
assets. 
 Rescue procedure(s) B)
The BBL set forth two new rescue proceedings, the recuperação 
judicial (judicial reorganisation) (item 6.2.2.1 below) and the 
recuperação extrajudicial (out-of-court reorganisation) (item 6.2.4 
below), both of which authorise debtors to obtain court 
confirmation of reorganisation plans negotiated directly with their 
creditors. 
Judic ia l  reorganisat ion  
Judicial reorganisation is a court-supervised proceeding – similar 
to Chapter 11 reorganisations under the US Bankruptcy Code – 
aimed to make it possible for a debtor to overcome economic and 
financial difficulty, allowing it to maintain its production source, 
its workforce, the interests of its creditors, and to preserve the 
company and its social function so as to foster economic activity 
(Article 47, BBL). 
Although it is a great step forward in relation to the former 
preventive bankruptcy, the process of judicial reorganisation 
entails a high cost, may be time consuming, and still generates 
a whole series of uncertainties, as the law is relatively new and 
has been little tested in certain aspects. Furthermore, if the 
plan is not approved by the creditors, there is the risk of 
bankruptcy being proclaimed. 
Judicial reorganisation is, at present, the most wide-ranging 
procedure for protection of the debtor, and it is to be 
recommended when there is no other viable alternative 
(informal work-out or out-of-court reorganisation), or when the 
effects produced by judicial reorganisation are not minimally 
useful to the debtor (the creditors covered by the plan account 
for a very small percentage of total liabilities, for example). 
In practical terms, it must be understood whether the debtor has 
a viable activity (a requisite for granting reorganisation), and if the 
plan to be proposed, once approved, will produce the necessary 
effects, given that various groups of creditors will not be covered 
by its effects. It is necessary to understand whether the debtor 
will be able to negotiate satisfactorily with creditors excluded 
from the judicial reorganisation and with any essential suppliers, 
and how the tax and social security liabilities can be handled. 
Eligibi l i ty  
A petition for judicial reorganisation can be filed with the court 
by a debtor (or the surviving spouse, heir or executor of an 
individual business debtor), or a partner or shareholder of a 
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debtor company. The creditors – regardless of their concern 
about the debtor’s need to submit to a reorganisation plan – 
continue to be at the mercy of any initiative taken by the debtor 
17. 
The petition must contain a statement of the material causes of 
the debtor’s indebtedness and of the reasons for its economic and 
financial crisis; further, it must be supported by certain 
documents, such as: 
– Accounting Statements: Accounting statements for the last 
three fiscal/financial years, in addition to those drawn up specially 
to support the petition, prepared in strict compliance with the 
applicable corporate legislation. Such financial statements shall 
necessarily include: Balance sheets; Accrued income statement; 
Income statement as from the last financial/fiscal year; and 
Management report on cash flow and projection thereof. 
– List of Creditors: A complete nominal list of the creditors 
including those under an obligation to do or to give, specifying, 
for each such creditor, the origin and initial due date of credits. 
Requirements  
A petition is not accepted by the court if the debtor: Has not 
been doing business regularly for at least two years; Is bankrupt 
or has been bankrupt, and the resulting liabilities have not been 
discharged by the final decision; Has used judicial reorganisation 
within the previous five years; Is an individual business person 
who has been convicted of certain crimes, or, in the case of a 
company, its employees, officers or controlling partners have 
been convicted of certain crimes. 
Summary o f  the process  f rom commencement to 
conc lus ion 
The documentation being in order, the court must accept the 
petition and processing order is granted (“Processing Order”). 
After the Processing Order, all claims (that are claiming an exact 
amount against the debtor) and enforcement proceedings against 
the debtor (except for the enforcement of tax-related debts) are 
stayed for a period of 180 calendar days. In principle, the stay 
period is non-extendable. However, courts have been allowing its 
extension upon certain conditions, notably when the debtor itself 
is not responsible for the delay in the reorganisation procedure.  
After a notice of the Processing Order is published in the official 
gazette, creditors are given 15 days to prove their claims or 
challenge the listed claims before the trustee, who is expected to 
analyse the claims and publish a notice setting forth the new list 
of creditors produced by him within 45 calendar days as from the 
end of the period to present a claim. 
                                                
17 At one stage, while the bill was in Congress, the draft contained the right for creditors 
to call for reorganisation of the debtor as in the US Bankruptcy Code. 
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The debtor must present a reorganisation plan within 60 calendar 
days as from the Processing Order. Once he plan is presented 
before court, a notice must be published in the official gazette 
informing that the debtor has presented a reorganisation plan. 
Since the reorganisation proceeding is based on a creditor-
approved reorganisation plan (and creditors thus play a central 
role in this new regime), creditors must approve the 
reorganisation plan. Therefore, creditors have 30 calendar days 
from publication of the abovementioned notice to file 
oppositions to the proposed reorganisation plan. 
If the plan is not opposed by any creditor, it is considered 
approved by tacit acceptance. However, if any creditor objects to 
the judicial reorganisation plan, a general meeting of creditors is 
convened by the judge to try to agree on a satisfactory plan. The 
meeting must be held within 150 days of the petition being 
accepted by the court. 
If the meeting of creditors rejects the reorganisation plan, the 
judge declares the debtor bankrupt. The decision adopted by the 
meeting of creditors is sovereign, and the judge only acts if 
anything unlawful is held to occur. 
Posi t ion o f  direc tors  (debtor in possess ion and 
personal  l iabil i ty i f  any) 
The debtor’s directors and officers remain in control of the 
debtor’s business (unless removed for cause). However, the court 
will appoint a trustee (administrador judicial) to oversee the 
debtor18. Under certain circumstances, a creditors’ committee 
(comitê de credores) may be formed to supervise the trustee and the 
debtor. The decision on whether to set up a creditors’ committee 
falls on the general meeting of creditors. 
Posi t ion o f  rescue pract i t ioner :  qual i f i cat ions ,  
appointment ,  powers and responsibi l i t i es  
Please see item 4 above. 
Requirements for  the plan,  i f  any,  and 
acceptance (vot ing) 
The reorganisation plan is a document presented in court by the 
debtor under judicial reorganisation, containing an analysis of its 
financial and economic condition, as well as evidence of 
economic feasibility of its business. The plan should list eligible 
creditors and must include the mechanisms for judicial 
reorganisation of the company and the proposed order and 
condition of distributions to creditors. 
The BBL provides an illustrative list of the judicial reorganisation 
mechanisms that can be adopted by debtors when preparing a 
                                                
18 Please see item § 2 above. 
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reorganisation plan, which include moratorium, debt 
restructuring, selling of assets, spin-off, merger or consolidation 
of a debtor’s business operations, assignment of shares or equity 
holdings of a company, leasing, and even the dismissal of the 
controller. The debtor may use a combination of means of 
reorganisation in the same plan and make different proposals for 
different groups of creditors. 
The creditors gathered at a general meeting of creditors (“GMC”) 
to resolve on the plan may submit proposals to change it. 
However, the debtor must give its express consent to any changes 
proposed before they are included in the plan to be submitted to 
the GMC for a resolution. 
For resolution purposes, the creditors are divided into four 
groups, namely: 
1. Creditors with labour-related claims; 
2. Creditors secured by collateral;  
3. Creditors with general and special privileges, 
unsecured creditors, and subordinated creditors; and 
4. Creditors classified as microenterprises or small 
companies. 
All four classes of creditors must approve the final plan (with any 
creditors’ change proposals already included). As a general rule, a 
proposed plan obtains creditor approval pursuant to the ordinary 
voting criteria, as follows: 
– Class #1 and Class # 4 : Approves the plan by a simple 
majority of creditors present or represented at the GMC (i.e., per 
capita voting), regardless of the amount of individual claims; and 
– Class #2 and Class #3: Approve the plan, per class, by creditors 
present or represented at the GMC holding (a) over 50% of the 
total amount of claims; and (b) by a simple majority of creditors 
(i.e., per capita voting). 
If the debtor fails to obtain sufficient creditor support for a 
proposed plan under the general rule, a court may nevertheless 
confirm the plan and grant the judicial reorganisation, provided 
that the plan has obtained, cumulatively, at the same GMC: (1) 
the favourable vote of creditors representing over 50% of the 
amount of all claims present or represented at the GMC 
(regardless of the class involved); (2) the approval of at least two 
classes, pursuant to the ordinary voting criteria; and (3) the 
favourable cumulative vote of over 1/3 of the creditors in the 
class (or classes) that rejected the plan (computed pursuant to the 
ordinary voting criteria). 
Votes may be cast by the persons set out in the general list of 
creditors; or, in the absence thereof, in the list of creditors 
prepared by the trustee; or else in the debtor’s list of creditors, 
supporting the petition for judicial reorganisation. Each holder 
of labour claims and microenterprises/small companies is 
entitled to one vote within its respective class, and the class of 
creditors not affected by the reorganisation plan has no say at 
the meeting resolving on the plan. 
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Morator ium 
As already mentioned, granting of judicial reorganisation bars any 
lawsuits (that are not claiming an exact amount against the 
debtor) and enforcements (but enforcements involving tax-related 
debts) against the debtor. Once the plan has been approved, there 
will be a conditional novation of the debtor’s liabilities, in the 
manner established in the plan, which may include a moratorium 
with respect to payment terms. 
In relation to the judicial reorganisation of microenterprises 
and small companies, the law contemplates the possibility of 
submitting a special plan, which does not require a general 
meeting of creditors, consisting basically of a moratorium for 
the debtor to pay its unsecured creditors in up to thirty-six 
monthly instalments. 
Treatment o f  credi tors  and the ir  c la ims 
All creditors subject to the effects of the judicial reorganisation 
that disagree with the amount or the classification of their claims 
must file an opposition or an objection. The method and 
conditions for payment of the respective claim must be set out in 
the reorganisation plan. 
Certain types of potentially significant claims are not subject to 
a judicial reorganisation, including claims arising from : (1) 
taxes ; (2) the owner (or committed seller) of real property 
(imóvel) where the relevant agreement contains an irrevocable or 
irreversibility clause (including real estate developments); (3) the 
owner in a sale contract with title retention (reserva de domínio); 
(4) advances of money on an export exchange contract 
(Adiantamento sobre Contrato de Câmbio – ACC) ; (5) the owner of 
a fiduciary lien on movable or immovable assets, such as a 
fiduciary sale agreement (alienação/cessão fiduciária); or (6) a 
leasing contract (arrendador mercantil). 
Although not subject to the effects of the judicial reorganisation 
and, therefore, to the effects of the automatic stay, granting of 
processing of the judicial reorganisation prevents creditors 
excluded from the judicial reorganisation from adopting, for a 
period of 180 days, measures aimed at removing capital goods 
essential for the debtor’s activities. This rule does not apply to 
aircraft leased by airlines under judicial reorganisation, as 
provided for in article 199 of the BBL. 
Posi t ion o f  shareholders/members 
The main effect of the judicial reorganisation on the company’s 
partners is the fact that the partners and certain persons related to 
them, although holding credits with the company under judicial 
reorganisation, have no voting rights at the general meeting of 
creditors that resolves on the plan. 
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Treatment o f  employees  
Filing for judicial reorganisation does not produce any change in 
employees’ rights, and the respective claims must be settled in the 
manner established in the reorganisation plan, subject to the legal 
provision that stipulates that labour claims must be settled in full 
within 12 months from court recognition of the judicial 
reorganisation plan. 
Treatment o f  avoidable  dispos i t ions and 
executory contracts 
The BBL has no rules dealing with the voidance of legal 
transactions carried out by the debtor in the event of judicial 
reorganisation, only in the event of bankruptcy. Judicial 
reorganisation is not, per se, cause for termination and does not 
grant the debtor the right to terminate executory contracts. 
Treatment o f  credi tors  and the ir  c la ims 
Filing for judicial reorganisation does not make any claim 
promptly enforceable; the treatment to be accorded to each 
affected claim must be set out in the plan of reorganisation. 
Tax impli cat ions 
Filing and/or granting of judicial reorganisation, or approval of 
the reorganisation plan, would not serve as grounds for use of 
losses as a tax benefit, which only occurs if the debtor is 
declared bankrupt. In most cases and depending on the 
percentage of debt recovery set out in the plan, this fact 
operates as a great incentive for the creditor to vote against 
approval of the plan so that the debtor is declared bankrupt 
and the creditor may take advantage of such tax benefit. 
Final isat ion o f  process :  i f  success ful  and i f  not  
Once the plan is approved and recovery is granted, the debtor 
continues with judicial reorganisation until all obligations 
established in the plan, and falling due up to two years after the 
start of proceedings, have been performed. In case of non-
performance of any obligation, its bankruptcy will be declared, 
otherwise recovery is closed.19 After the two-year period, if any 
obligation established in the plan is not performed, the unpaid 
creditor can petition for specific performance or for the debtor's 
bankruptcy. 
                                                
19 In the vast majority of reorganisation petitions filed since the BBL came into force, 
the two-year period was not observed, and the companies changed the originally 
approved wording of plans, remaining under reorganisation for an indefinite period. 
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1)  Informal work-outs20 
Brazilian creditors usually take a dim view of group compromises; 
instead, they prefer to negotiate directly with the debtor.21. The 
effects of those crises that ravaged the US economy and the 
Brazilian energy and telecom industry in the last decade had a 
deep impact on negotiations by changing the behaviour in 
collective debt renegotiation processes. 
The fact that said crises affected Brazilian companies controlled 
by foreign parent companies (usually more acquainted with 
informal work-out mechanisms), and also considering that 
substantial debts were then being renegotiated, had an interesting 
effect. Creditors and debtors joined efforts to find out solutions 
for payment of debts on the best conditions possible for 
creditors and debtors, namely: as soon as possible and in a way 
to preserve the business, respectively.22 
Within this context, the BBL introduced the extrajudicial 
reorganisation in the Brazilian insolvency system (please see item 
6.2.3 below) and expressly acknowledged in its article 16723 that 
the debtor could negotiate informal work-outs with creditors, all 
of which as a means of encouraging the negotiation of 
agreements with groups of creditors chosen by the debtor. 
This represented a major U-turn, as the Prior Bankruptcy Law 
prohibited debtors from negotiating reorganisation schemes with 
creditors. Under the Prior Bankruptcy Law, a negotiation could be 
sanctioned with what was referred to as an ‘act of bankruptcy’24 
These acts automatically opened the door to a bankruptcy petition 
against the debtor, which could be decreed regardless of the 
debtor’s economic condition, that is to say, even if it were solvent. 
On the other hand, the only reorganisation structure provided for in 
the Prior Bankruptcy Law that has been repealed by the BBL was 
the application for the so-called ‘preventive concordata’, which was no 
more than a moratorium imposed by the debtor on unsecured 
credits. This is why this stance of imposition by the debtor is so 
rooted in Brazilian life, and constitutes one of the main difficulties 
                                                
20 Discuss generally the laws, practices and procedures pertaining to non-judicial 
rehabilitation, workouts and restructurings. Compare with judicial (formal) 
reorganisations. This should be a general discussion of the environment for such 
procedures. (Use of INSOL rules or London approach etc, approach of Banks.) 
21 This topic partially reproduces the author’s views already expressed in other articles, 
specially in the chapter “Out-of-court Reorganisation” included in the book edited by 
him, titled “Direito Falimentar e a Nova Lei de Falências e Recuperação de Empresas”, 
Quartier Latin, 2005, page 561 et seq. 
22 A. ARAÚJO ; L. PAIVA, “A Transparência na Lei de Falências”, Jornal O Globo. Rio de 
Janeiro, 23 jun. 2004. 
23 “Article 167. The provisions of this Chapter do not rule out other types of private 
settlement between the debtor and his creditors.” 
24 Despite this prohibition, the attempt to prevent negotiation between debtors and 
creditors, as introduced in the Brazilian legal system by the Prior Bankruptcy Law, did 
not work out since debtors frequently negotiated through fronting parties the 
assignment of credits at a discount that were not always the same for all creditors. This 
means that there have always been negotiations between debtors and creditors, albeit 
outside the realm of the law. 
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for implementation of a new type of behaviour that is necessary for 
use of the new mechanisms provided by the BBL. 
The fact is that the increasing adhesion to informal work-out 
even before the BBL came into force gained momentum with the 
existence of a speedier procedure for obtaining ratification of a 
plan with a cram-down on non-adherent creditor, resulting in a 
stimulus to execution of several private settlements closed after 
the BBL came into effect. 
However, the INSOL rules or London approach are far from 
being widely accepted and/or adopted in Brazil. The difficulty 
lies, in the first place, on the fact that an informal work-out 
assumes a voluntary adhesion by the creditors. It is a fact that in 
most relevant cases there is always a group of creditors that are 
more willing to offer a standstill to the debtor. But a creditor in 
possession of an automatically enforceable collateral (e.g. a 
fiduciary lien on receivables) would hardly give up on the right to 
enforce such collateral and lower its credit. 
Further as regards the standstill, it is nearly impossible to have 
government-owned banks adhere to this arrangement, as their 
representatives are afraid of taking actions that could later be 
viewed as a waiver of rights. The difficulty is even greater when 
smaller banks are involved, as a default would have a far greater 
impact on their balance sheets. Such unresponsiveness, which 
oftentimes ends up shooing other banks away, could be mitigated 
if there were rules or regulations (issued by the Brazilian Central 
Bank, for instance) instructing banks to join informal work-outs 
and according a special accounting treatment during the standstill 
period. However, the fact is that, apart from the situations above, 
a group of creditors usually accept to take no actions against the 
debtor, whereas the debtor accepts to take no action that would 
impair the rights of creditors in general or of any specific creditor. 
Whenever it is possible to agree on a standstill or on an 
informal moratorium (without signing any document to that 
end), one or more banks (generally those holding the highest 
exposure) usually take the lead in the negotiation process. The 
difficulty usually lies in the agreement on sharing of expenses 
involved, especially with regard to hiring of financial advisors 
(to diagnose the debtor’s condition) and of legal advisors; 
sharing information with creditors that have not contributed to 
this work is usually difficult as well. On the other hand, not 
always the debtor is sufficiently open to disclosure of all 
information necessary, whether because the debtor has 
something to hide or because it fears that such information 
may be used against it during the very negotiations (or at a later 
moment, if negotiations fail). 
Finally, creditors are usually reluctant to contribute fresh funds, 
the more so if the debtor does not have assets on which a 
fiduciary lien could be placed as security. In some cases, it was 
possible to restructure all existing guarantees by replacing former 
ones with new instruments shared among all creditors (as in a 
syndicated transaction). 
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In practical terms, there is an initial attempt at carrying out an 
informal work-out in nearly all relevant cases, especially those 
where public awareness of the debtor’s financial straits could 
have a strong negative impact on its business and thus make its 
recovery difficult or impossible. In the Brazilian scenario, the 
success of any such initiative is far dependent on the situation 
involved and on the debtor’s openness, on the profile of 
creditor banks (especially whether there are government-owned 
banks and small banks with relevant exposure) and on the 
respective guarantees. 
Even so, there is still a strong cultural resistance against 
creditors negotiating out of court. It is not always possible to 
mobilise creditors, or, when they are mobilised, they do not 
react and cooperate within the timing required by the debtor. 
As a result of this fact, and also of the rather simple nature of 
legal provisions that address the chapter on out-of-court 
reorganisation, during these almost seven years since enactment 
of the BBL, we have heard of slightly over a dozen filings for out-
of-court reorganisation, which is very few. 
2) Treatment o f  pre-pack arrangements .  Out-
o f - court  r e o r g an i s a t i o n  
This procedure is in many aspects similar to a “pre-package 
reorganisation” proceeding under Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code. Under it, a financially distressed debtor 
negotiates the terms of a plan of reorganisation (i.e., a “pre-
package plan”), privately, with its creditors. After the debtor 
obtains the required creditors’ support for such plan, it will start a 
legal proceeding aiming to obtain court ratification of the pre-
package (approved) plan. 
There are two types of out-of-court reorganisations: 
– Homologation of consensus (recuperação homologatória): This 
procedure can be conceptualised as a procedure by which the 
debtor files with the courts for homologation of an out-of-court 
reorganisation plan signed by all creditors subject to it. Court 
homologation of the plan is binding only on those parties that 
have entered the agreement. The only benefit of the 
Homologation of Consensus procedure, when compared to 
other private agreements (not ruled by the BBL), lies in the fact 
that the court homologation order constitutes an enforcement 
instrument (título executivo), which can be enforced through a 
“fast-track” procedure. 
– Enforcement of agreement (recuperação impositiva): This procedure 
calls for prior agreement and signature to the plan by creditors 
representing more than 60% of the credits of each class, type, or 
group of creditors subject to such plan.25 For calculation of the 
qualifying percentage, credits denominated in foreign currency are 
                                                
25 This percentage is calculated on the total amount of the credits affected by the plan 
and not on the number of affected creditors. 
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converted into Brazilian currency at the exchange rate effective 
on the day before the plan is signed. In the Enforcement of 
Agreement procedure the court-recognized plan is binding on all 
creditors affected by the plan, whether or not they have expressly 
and previously agreed with it, or even manifestly expressed 
opposition to it. Provided the minimum percentage level of 
agreement has been met, the conditions specified in the plan are 
imposed on the creditors who did not sign it, and indeed on those 
who expressly rejected it. In other words, the BBL provides for a 
form of cram-down system. 
An out-of-court reorganisation plan can be initiated by a debtor26, 
a partner or shareholder of a debtor company, or the surviving 
spouse, heir or executor of an individual business debtor, if the 
debtor: Meets the same legal requirements as for judicial 
reorganisation; and Has not been subject to an out-of-court 
reorganisation ratified by a court within the last two years; 
The debtor’s directors and officers remain in control of the 
debtor’s business and there is no court supervision. 
The effects of extrajudicial reorganisation do not reach those 
same creditors not covered by judicial reorganisation (please see 
item 6.2.1.8 above), nor the holders of labour claims. 
Under the BBL, the plan produces effects in relation to the 
debtor and creditors that are subject to it only after it has been 
homologated by the court. However, since the nature of an out-
of-court reorganisation is contractual, the signatories to the plan 
may agree differently in a case of Homologation of Consensus, 
so that the plan produces effects before its homologation in 
relation to the clauses that change the amount of the debt or the 
payment method. However, such a provision can only bind 
creditors who are signatories to the plan, since in the case of 
Enforcement of Agreement it will only produce effects after 
homologation by the court for all non-signatory creditors to the 
plan. 
The plan is not binding on the parties if it is not homologated, 
and in this case the creditors resume the right to demand and 
enforce their respective credits and claims on the original 
conditions. However, any release of the creditors in case the plan 
is not homologated in court seems to be a contractual issue and 
would need to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 
The procedure, which is common to both extrajudicial 
reorganisation modes, is rather straightforward and usually 
expeditious as no interlocutory decisions are involved; adversary 
proceedings are limited to an opposition against court 
homologation of the plan. 
Once the petition is distributed, creditors will have 30 days from 
publication of the public notice calling creditors to challenge the 
homologation petition for non-fulfilment of any formal 
requirement; the financial and economic conditions proposed by 
                                                
26To see who is eligible to file an out-of-court reorganisation, please see item 
Eligibility above. 
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the debtor cannot be challenged at this point. This is because 
negotiations ended before the petition was filed, and applicable 
conditions are those stated in the plan. 
If oppositions are made, the debtor will have five days to answer. 
The judge will have a like period to resolve on this issue and 
render a decision. If a pre-package plan is not homologated by 
the court, the debtor may continue to operate its business, file 
another pre-package plan or even seek to commence a judicial 
reorganisation. Upon homologation, the extrajudicial 
reorganisation plan becomes effective as regards all creditors 
covered by it, whether or not dissenting creditors have adhered to 
the plan. 
In brief, the new mechanisms tend to be on the one hand 
efficacious and fast, and on the other, less expensive, complex 
and traumatic. The judicial reorganisation tends to be adopted 
only when: (1) the out-of-court attempt has not been successful; 
(2) the profile of the debt is not appropriate for the use of out-
of-court reorganisation procedures; (3) the debtor has to request 
and obtain a re-profiling of its tax debts; (4) the plan includes the 
sale of assets and there is interest in avoiding the risks of 
succession caused by tax and social security debts; (5) the plan 
contemplates acts capable of being considered ineffective in the 
event of adjudication of debtor’s bankruptcy (i.e. liquidation) and 
the creditors are interested in having specific protections against 
future clawback/revocatory claims concerning such acts; and (6) 
when the plan includes adjustments of an operational nature that 
call for more specific monitoring or supervision. 
  Cross-border insolvency rules C)
The BBL does not contain provisions governing cross-border 
insolvency cases. Also, the Brazilian legislature is currently 
considering to amend the BBL to adopt a version of the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency that was promulgated by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”). 
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